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ABSTRACT
The objective of this note is to show that the positively valued excess supplies which Aiyagari
(1992) connects with Pareto inefficiency for overlapping generations economies represent
an economic opportunity that can potentially be exploited by government or by a private
financial intermediary through the issuance of unsecured debt. We demonstrate that, when
unsecured debt is issued, Walras' Law does not fail in the sense described by Aiyagari.
However, the mere issuance of unsecured debt does not ensure Pareto efficiency. We show
that Pareto efficiency is achieved if and only if the opportunity to issue unsecured debt is
optimally exploited, for example, by an earnings-driven private financial intermediary.
"Please address correspondence to L. Tesfatsion, Department of Economics, Iowa State University. Ames,
lA 50011-1070.
1. Introduction
In a recent paper, Aiyagari (1992) demonstrates a connection between the failure of
Walras' Law and nonoptimal equihbria in overlappinggenerations economies. The significant
implication ofWalras' Law in finite economies, given all prices are positive and all consumers
are locally nonsatiated, is that an excess supply (in value terms) cannot exist for some
subset of goods without an excess demand (in value terms) existing for some other subset of
goods. Aiyagari defines the failure ofWalras' Law as a situation in which this implication of
Walras' Law does not hold. His basic (and interesting) result is to show that "a competitive
equilibrium is nonoptimal if and only if the above implication of Walras' Law fails in its
neighborhood."
Aiyagari (1992, section 2) clearly demonstrates that Walras' Law can fail for an OGecon
omy in this sense. But shouldn't we be skeptical of"a model in which positively valued excess
supplies can occur in equilibrium? After all, where do the excess supplies go? Nonsatiated
consumers would not simply throw the excesses away.
The objective of this note is to show that the positively valued excess supplies which
Aiyagari connects with Pareto inefficiency represent an unexploited economic opportunity.
Moreover, it is an opportunity that can potentially be exploited by government or by a
private financial intermediary through the issuance of unsecured, debt. We demonstrate
below that, when unsecured debt is issued, Walras' Law does not fail in the sense described
by Aiyagari. However, the mere issuance of unsecured debt does not ensure Pareto efficiency.
We show that Pareto efficiency is achieved if and oiily if the opportunity to issue unsecured
debt is exploited to its fullest extent, for example, by a.n earnings-driven private financial
intermediary.
2. An OG Economy With No Unsecured Debt Issue
Consider a pure exchange overlapping generations (OG) economy which begins in period
1
1 and, extends into the infinite future. One perishable consumable resource exists, which
is distinguished in period t as "good f." At the beginning of each period a single two-
period lived "generation i consumer" is born. The generation t consumer is endowed with
nj'' > 0 units of good t and > 0 units of good f + 1, His preferences over consumption
profiles are represented by a utihty function that is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly quasi-concave, strictly increasing, and satisfies i7(cj',0) = =
(/{0,0) and
MRS(w\w°) = Ux{w^,w'')IU2{w\w') < 1. (1):
It is also assumed that consumer preferences satisfy gross substitutability.^
The population of the economy in period 1 consists of the young generation 1 consumer
and one old "generation 0 consumer." The generation 0 consumer has an endowment of
vf > 0, prefers more consumption to less, and dies at the end of period 1.
Intertemporal trades are facilitated by a price system p = (pi,p2>- ••)' where pf denotes
the price of good t in terms of a unit of account. Given this price system, the lifetime utility
maximization problem faced by each generation t consumer, i > 1, takes the form:
max t/(cf><+i) (2)
with respect to subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
+ ^ \ (3)
cr>0, (4)
Given the stated restrictions on consumer preferences, any solution to this utility maximiza
tion problem must satisfy
= Pt/Pt+i ' (5)
^In the model at hand, gross substitutability implies that an increase in the rate at which thegeneration
t consumer can trade good t for good t -H 1 results in an increase in his optimal savings, t > 1.
Finally, the consumption level of the generation 0 consumer is given by
picl-piw°. (6)
Let c ~ (cj, (c^, c2), (c2, c§),...) denote an allocation for the economy. A nonnegative
allocation c isfeasible if and only if themarket for good t clears in each period t > 1, in the
sense that
w'' , t>l . (7)
Following Aiyagari (1992, Section 2.1), an equilibrium for the economy is an allocation c > 0
and a price system p > 0 that satisfy conditions (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7).
Ifthe market clearing conditions (7) were required to hold as equalities, then it is straight
forward to show that the unique equilibrium allocation for the economy would be the "au
tarkic' allocation in which each consumer directly consumes his endowment profile and the
price sequence p satisfies pt/pt+i = MRS{w^yW°) for all i > 1, However, because the mar
ket clearing conditions (7) allow for excess supply, the autarkic allocation is not the only
equilibrium allocation for the economy. In fact, there axe an infinite number of equilibrium
allocations. What is unique about the autarkic allocation is that it is the only equilib
rium allocation for which the value of excess supply is zero in every market. For all other
equihbrium allocations, at least one market has a positively valued excess supply.
To illustrate, consider Figure 1where an offer curve is drawn for the generation t consumer
along with three hfetime budget constraints. For simplicity, consider only the stationary
equilibria for which the (gross) rate of return pt/pt+i takes on a constant yalue p for all
t > 1, with MRS{w^j w°) </><!. The constant rate of return implies that each generation t
consumer consumes the same consumption profile (cf, c?+i) = (c^, c°). Moreover, the lifetime
budget constraint (3) reduces to pc^ c" = pw^ -1- w'' for all i > 1, implying that
- c" = [1 - p][w^ - c^] > 0. •(8)
Three possible cases will now be considered: p = MRS{w^,w°)\ p = l\ and MRS{w''^
</?<!. These three cases correspond to the three lifetime budget constraints depicted in
Figure 1.
If p = MRS{w^then for each i > 1, impying that the-market
clearing conditions (7) holds as equalities for all t > 2. Since pi > 0, it follows from (6) that
the generation 0 consumer consumes his endowment (i.e., cj = w°)^ hence market clearing
also holds as an equality for i = 1. Consequently, as noted, above, no excess supply exists in
this autarkic equilibrium.
If p = 1, then (Cf,c?+i) equals the "golden rule" consumption profile (c^,c®) for each
^> 1, and condition (8) implies that the market clearing conditions (7) hold as equalities for
all i > 2. In period 1, the generation 0 consumer consumes his endowment (i.e., cj = ly"),
while the generation 1 consumer consumes less than his endowment (i.e., c\ = ^). Thus,
there is an excess supply of good 1 in period 1 (i.e., ^ + c® < + w^). Since pi > 0, this
period 1 excess supply is positively valued, meaningWalras' Law fails.
If /9 = where •MRS{w^,w°) < ^ < 1, then (c5',c(^i) = (c^,c°) for each ^ > 1, where
^ < w^. Together with condition (8), this implies that an excess supply of good t exists
in each period t > 2. In period 1, the generation 0 old consumer consumes his endowment
(i.e., cj = w°) while the generation 1 young consumer consumes less than-his endowment
(i.e., Cj = c^). Thus, an excess supply of good 1 exists in period 1 (i.e., c\-\- + w^).
Since > 0 for all i > 1, the excess supply present in each period t>l is positively valued,
meaning Walras' Law fails.
Nonstationary equilibria exist for this model as well. However, the results presented
here are sufficient to demonstrate the meaning of Aiyagari's assertion that Walras' Law fails
for the OG model. Considering all equihbria for the economy- presented here, stationary
and nonstationary, it can be shown that a positively valued excess supply exists in every
equilibrium except the autarkic equilibrium.
To this point, the intermediation process for the economy has not been explicitly articu
lated. The precise form of this intermediation process would not be significant if positively
valued excess supplies did not occur in equilibrium. However, positively valued excess sup
plies do occur; and because it does not make sense that nonsatiated consumers would discard
valuable resources, it is important to consider what happens to these excess supplies. If the
intermediary were a central clearing house, then the clearing house would hold any excess
supplies after the trades had been made. Recognizing this, it is evident that there is an op
portunity associated with intermediation in this model that is not being recognized. What
consumer would not want to own the clearing house?
In the next section, we show that the issuance of unsecured debt allows this intermediation
opportunity to be exploited, and Walras' Law (in Aiyagari's sense) no longer fails.
3. An OG Economy With Unsecured Debt Issue
Suppose the economy described' in section 2 is now modified by having the generation 0
old consumer issue unsecured debt in amount Dq. Let this unsecured debt be taken as the
unit of account, so that the pricept denotes the number ofunits of unsecured debt necessary
to buy one unit of good t in period t. Under these assumptions, the budget constraint of the
generation 0 old consumer becomes
,c? =id" +^ . (9)
Consumers in generations t > 1 are not allowed to issue debt, but they are allowed to
purchase old debt and then to resell it. Debt can also be sold short, allowing consumers
to borrow. No other intermediation options are available. Under these assumptions, the
lifetime utility maximization problem faced by the generation t consumer, t > 1, takes the
form:
max (10)
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with respect to subject to the budget and nonnegativity constraints
c\ = (11)
Pt
+ (12)
c?>0, c°„>0. (13)
Let D = (Do, Di, D2,...) denotethe sequence ofunsecured debt holdings for the economy.
An equilibrium for the economy is then a triplet (c, p,D) consisting of an allocation "c > 0,
a price system p > 0, and a debt sequence D that satisfy conditions (5), (7), (9), (11), (12),
and (13), together with the following market clearing condition for the unsecured debt:
A-i > Dt for all / > 1 . (14)
Recall that unsecured debt is issued only once, in period 1, hence the supply of unsecured
debt available in each period t > 1 is given by the unsecured debt Dt^i held by generation
t-l.
The young age and old age budget constraints (11) and (12) together generate the lifetime
budget constraint (3). Thus, there are only two essential differences between the economy
presented here and the economy presented in section 2. First, the generation 0 consumer can
here receive a wealth windfall from the issuance of unsecured debt, whereas no such windfall
waspreviously possible. Second, the mediumof exchangeis here explicitly identified as being
unsecured debt, whereas the medium of exchange was not previously specified.
Although Walras' Law was shown to fail for the economy without unsecured debt, it
cannot fail for the present economy. To understand this, note that by combining the young
age budget constraint for generation t with the old age budget constraint for generation t —1
one obtains
+ uj"—Cf —c°] + [A-i —-^(1 = 0 , t >1 . (15)
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Using condition (15), a positively valued excess supply of good t implies an excess demand
for unsecured debt in period i, a violation of the market clearing condition (14). Thus, no
positively valued excess supply of any good t '> I can- exist in equilibrium, meaning Walras
Law cannot fail. ' -
This restoration of Walras' Law rules out some of the inefficient equilibria obtained for
the section 2 economy. For example, because an excess supply is-no longer possible in
equiUbrium, none of the allocations for the section 2 economy that were associated with
rates of return-/) satisfying MRS{w^,w°) < p < I can now be supported as equiUbria.
Nevertheless, Pareto efficiency is still not ensured. As is known from Gale (1973), Pareto
efficiency for the present economy dependsupon the real value of the'period 1 unsecured debt.
If the period 1 price pi is such that the initial real debt level is given by Do/pi = [c® —
then the economy has a unique stationary Pareto efficient equilibrium allocation in which
each generation t consumer consumes the golden rule consumption profile (c,,cj\.i) = (c^, c®),
the generation 0 consumer consumes = c®, and the rate of return in each period i > 1
is given by /) = 1. Alternatively, if pi = +oo so that Do/pi = 0 (i.e., the unsecured debt
is worthless), then the only possible equilibrium allocation is the Pareto inefficient autarkic
allocation in which each consumer simply consumes his own endowment in each period t. If
0 < Dq/pi < c° — then a nonstationary Pareto inefficient equilibrium allocation results,
with the consumption profile of the generation t consumer converging to the endowment
profile as t becomes arbitrarily large. Finally, increasing the initial unsecured debt level
above c —ly" puts the economy on a path to economic collapse, for the real demand for
unsecured debt exceeds the total endowment of the economy in finite time.
In summary, in the present economy, Pareto efficiency is obtained if and only if full
advantage is taken of the gain which can be had from issuing unsecured debt. In Pingle
and Tesfatsion (1991a,b;1993) it is shown that the opportunity to obtain a wealth windfall
by issuing unsecured debt can be exploited by earnings-driven private intermediaries (e.g.,
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through the issue of corporate debentures) as well as by a government (e.g., through the
issue of fiat money). Indeed, in Pingle and Tesfatsion (1991b) it is shown that the earnings
objective of the private corporate intermediary is satisfied if and only if price conditions
hold which are analogous to the Cass-Balasko-Shell transversaUty condition elaborated in
Balasko and Shell (1980), a necessary and sufficient condition for Pareto efficiency. But as
elaborated in Pingle and Tesfatsion (1993), these price conditions push to economy to the
very brink of economic collapse, in the sense that any slight increase in the rate of return
in any period t pushes the economy onto an explosive infeasible path. Consequently, there
is still much to learn concerning unsecured debt issue (public and private), efficiency, and
economic instabiHty in OG economies.
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Offer Curve
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